

# THE CALL TO ISLAM: DIVERSE METHODS AND VARIED RESPONSES

## ABSTRACT

This paper will initially consider the diversity of Muslims. It will then discuss how Islam, a missionary faith, is translated by different Muslims into a wide array of methods of outreach, ranging from traditional evangelistic approaches to use of cutting edge technology. Also addressed will be Christian responses to Islamic Outreach.

## 1. IS ISLAM A MISSIONARY RELIGION?

Non-Muslim writers have long identified Islam as a religion with outreach at its core. Sir Thomas Arnold (1864-1930) wrote that "Islam was from the very outset a missionary religion."<sup>1</sup> Arnold's contemporary Charles Haines (1859-1935) wrote a work entitled *Islam as a Missionary Religion*<sup>2</sup> focusing upon the central calling of the faith to summon others to its ranks.

Such a view is by no means an imposition upon Islam by non-Muslims. On the contrary, many Muslims readily identify their faith as missionary at its essence. The Muslim American Society, a relatively new group in the United States, writes as follows on its website:

"The Muslim regards himself as commanded by God to call ... the whole

of humankind to a life in which Islam, the religion of God, with its theology and Shari'a, its ethics and institutions, is the religion of all humans."<sup>3</sup>

This statement establishes a direction of activity that is the opposite of traditional Christian views of mission. While Christianity sees itself as a sending faith, Islam sees itself as a faith which calls.

## **The Scriptural basis for Islamic Outreach**

Such clear calls for Muslims to engage in outreach for their faith are firmly grounded in Islam's sacred text, the Qur'an, considered as the very word of God, received directly and transferred without alteration to humanity by Muhammad, prophet of Islam, between 610-632 CE. Many verses clearly state the need for Muslims to call, summon and invite others to join the faith:

[16:125] Invite (all) to the Way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful exhortation; and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious: for thy Lord knoweth best, who have strayed from His Path, and who receive guidance.

The following verse adds a further dimension, by reminding Muslims that

calling others is not merely for the benefit of those called, but also for the caller:

[41:33] Who can utter better words than one who invites to GOD, works righteousness, and says, "I am one of the submitters"?

Moreover, Muslims are also reminded by the Qur'an that the reason for calling others is that the faith of Islam is the true faith. Remember that God is speaking through the words of the sacred text, and the message of supercessionism is clear, with the People of the Book – Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians – no longer possessing divine revelation which can be relied upon:

[3:110] Ye are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah. If only the People of the Book had faith, it were best for them: among them are some who have faith, but most of them are perverted transgressors.

**A holistic faith**

Another key feature is the nature of Islam as a holistic creed. The sacred text and accompanying early writings do not limit Islam to a faith for Fridays, but portray it as a set of doctrines and ritual duties, a powerful legal system, a

number of financial processes, a method for organising society, a basis for political involvement, and much more. So Western notions deriving from the Enlightenment emphasising the separation between sacred and secular are not relevant to traditional views of the Islamic faith by its adherents.

The statement cited earlier by the Muslim American Society emphasises Islam's holistic nature by referring to it as "Islam, the religion of God, with its theology and Shari'a, its ethics and institutions". Ahmad F. Yousif also forcefully underlines this holistic aspect of Islam:

"The concept of separation between religion and state is completely alien to the Islamic world-view, which views the two as being inextricably linked...The primary responsibility of the state is to ensure the dictates of the Shari'ah (Islamic law) are duly implemented."<sup>4</sup>

**The Context: Migration of Muslims to the West**

With the call to Islam, or da'wa, therefore lying at the centre of the faith, social developments in the late 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries have provided a significant new set of circumstances that challenge Muslims, both scholars and lay people, to develop their skills in outreach.<sup>5</sup>

**Table 1 Muslim Populations in European Countries**

• France:	6 million;	• 9.6%
• Netherlands:	945,000;	• 5.8%
• Denmark:	270,000;	• 5%
• Austria:	339,000;	• 4.1%
• Germany:	3 million;	• 3.6%
• Britain:	2 million;	• 3%
• Spain:	1 million;	• 2.3%
• Italy:	825,000;	• 1.4%
• [Turkey:] <sup>8</sup>	[68 million]	• 98%

Muslim immigration to Western countries, the historical centres of Christianity and its mission, has been substantial since the 1970s. The Muslim population of Europe more than doubled in the 30 years up to 2009.<sup>6</sup> Today Muslim minorities in Europe are reflected by the following numbers and percentages of total populations:<sup>7</sup>

Such figures only tell part of the story, of course. Muslim newcomers to European countries have tended to cluster in specific locations, especially in the cities, with the result that certain cities have far higher percentages of Muslims in their populations than country-based percentages would suggest.

Such population movements triggered much Muslim scholarly thinking about the roles and responsibilities of these Muslim diaspora communities. Islamic Law, as fashioned in the classical period of the great Islamic empires, had assumed that Muslims were in ruling positions. The concept of a permanent Muslim minority was alien to Islamic Law; the assumption was that Muslims in minority situations living under non-Muslim rule would seek to return to Muslim majority areas. So the large population movements in the latter decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century prompted Islamic scholars to address a new reality.

The solution that was arrived at was that the continuing presence of Muslims in minority situations was acceptable providing that such Muslims sought to engage in Islamic outreach wherever they were. In doing so, such Muslims would be fulfilling a key religious obligation. In the words of the liberally-minded Zaki Badawi, late spiritual head of Britain's Muslim commu-

nity: "Islam is a proselytising religion. It's not a matter of being essential to our future: it is more or less a duty of a Muslim to proclaim his religion and to see if other people would be attracted to it."<sup>9</sup>

This theme for Muslim minorities to call others to Islam has been enunciated time and again by leading Islamic scholars. The famous Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi, more activist by nature than Zaki Badawi, speaks forcefully on this issue, spelling out the role of each individual Muslim in minority communities:

"Muslims in the west ought to be sincere callers to their religion. They should keep in mind that calling others to Islam is not only restricted to scholars and Sheikhs, but it goes far to encompass every committed Muslim. As we see scholars and Sheikhs delivering khutbas [sermons] and lectures, writing books to defend Islam, it is no wonder to find lay Muslims practicing da`wah while employing wisdom and fair exhortation."<sup>10</sup>

A key facilitator of Islamic outreach in the British context was the late Khuram Murad, ideologue of the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami and former Head of the Jamaat-inspired Islamic Foundation in Leicester. In his seminal work *Islamic Movement in the West*, Murad makes clear his view that Muslims in the West were facing a historic opportunity to spread the faith. He wrote:

'An Islamic movement is an organised struggle to change the existing society into an Islamic society based on the Qur'an and the Sunna, and make Islam, which is a code for

entire life, supreme and dominant, especially in the socio-political spheres.<sup>11</sup>

And further:

'I have no hesitation in suggesting that, despite its seeming unattainability, the movement in the West should reaffirm and re-emphasise the concept of total change and supremacy of Islam in the Western society as its ultimate objective and allocate to it the highest priority.'<sup>12</sup>

## 2. COMPETITORS IN ISLAMIC OUTREACH

Before surveying the methods used by Muslims in their outreach, it is important to consider internal diversity which characterizes the worldwide Muslim community. Such diversity can be seen in terms of wide-ranging criteria: ethnicity (Arab, Turkish, Persian, Malay/Indonesian etc); geography (Arab World, Central Asia, South Asia etc., European); nationality (Egyptian, Moroccan, Pakistani, British, American); sectarian groups (Sunni, Shi'a, Isma'ili, Ahmadi etc.), and various other typologies. But a particularly helpful way to slice the Muslim cake, as it were, is to consider different Muslim views of and approaches to their sacred texts and to authority within the faith. If this is done we might see a two-fold split at the macro level, between Traditionalists and Reformists.

Traditionalists see the accumulated wisdom of scholars down the centuries as being the key rudder to guide their own interpretation and practice of their faith. Such Muslims typically

follow their religious leaders in forming key opinions and making important decisions. These leaders might be mosque imams or text-focused religious scholars (ulama), or if Muslims have particular mystical leanings they might be led by more charismatically-inclined spiritual guides (wali) who they view as having special powers of blessing and even intercessory powers.

### **Competing in reform**

Against the Traditionalist stand the Reformists, for whom the scholarly wisdom accumulated down the centuries serves more to clutter up the essential message of the faith of Islam. Reformists broadly fall into two types. First come the literalists, for whom the primary texts and the Prophet should form the main rudder for facing up to the challenges of the modern world. These reformists are more backward looking, reading straight from the page of the texts and the Prophet's life into the contemporary world. They are Islamist, in that they stress the holistic nature of Islam, making it relevant to politics, society, economics and so forth. Furthermore, for this group, the imperative to create Islamic states based on literal applications of Shari'a Law is key. This group includes some who are violent and respond to the call to military jihad.

Against the more literalist-minded Islamists stand Modernising Reformists. While they share the reforming zeal of the Islamists, wanting to use the primary texts as the rudder for facing the challenges of the modern world, the Modernisers treat the primary texts quite differently from the Islamists. The Modernisers read the texts rationally rather than literally,

allowing their interpretation to be shaped by the realities of the modern world around them. They argue that some parts of the primary texts and Shari'a legal codes are time-bound in their application, having been suitable to 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> century social contexts but no longer having relevance to the 21<sup>st</sup> century world. While the Islamists look backwards for their answers, the Modernizers look ahead.

While such labels do not neatly fit all circumstances and all individuals, it is possible to broadly identify people and groups along these lines. So of those mentioned in previous sections, the label Islamist would apply readily to Pakistan's Jamaat-e-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as Abul A'la Mawdudi, Muhammad al-Ghazali and Khurram Murad. On the other hand, Dr Zaki Badawi is a clear example of a Modernizing Reformist.

### **The Saudis and Wahhabism**

When considering what are the main engine rooms for Islamic outreach, we should look first to Saudi Arabia. With its seemingly limitless oil wealth, which has increased in value enormously with rising oil prices in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Saudis are well placed to promote their own particular brand of Islam: Wahhabism. This stream of Islam can be traced back to the revolution of the literalist, scripture-driven Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-92), a reformist who called for the importance of monotheism, the rejection of the notion of mediation between God and the faithful, the obligation to pay zakat (charitable giving, one of the pillars of Islam) to the leader of the Muslim community, and "the obligation to respond to [the leader's] call for holy war against those who did not

follow these principles."<sup>13</sup> Abd al-Wahhab emphasized the need to apply a strict interpretation of Shari'a, under the guidance of the political authorities (i.e. who were at the same time equal to or in close alliance with the religious authorities).

The spirit of Abd al-Wahhab lives on through today's Saudi rulers, who use the above principles as building blocks in creating the austere, literalist state of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, such principles fuel much of the activity of Muslim communities beyond Arabia, because of Saudi influence in expanding Islamic communities around the Western world. This influence has been facilitated by the size of the Saudi cheque book; in the three decades since the oil crisis of the mid 1970s, Saudis have reportedly invested \$70-80 billion dollars in promoting their brand of Islam around the world.<sup>14</sup> The following sections will unveil some of the ways through which these funds have been disbursed.

### **Turkey: the Gulen Movement**

A very different approach to promoting Islam comes out of Turkey, in the form of the Gulen Movement, based on the ideas of the influential Turkish thinker Fetullah Gulen. For Gulen, Islam does not need a Sharia-based state to survive. Provided there is freedom of religion and speech, civil society can support Islam. According to Professor Ýhsan Ýılmaz of Fatih University in Turkey, "Gulen has always focused on individual piety, arguing that the Qur'an is not a political project to be implemented but is rather a book of guidance for the individual towards the Hereafter."<sup>15</sup> The Gulen approach to inter-religious relations is that Muslims should live their faith through their

actions in all times and places, rather than engaging in overt preaching to others.

With such a view, the role of Muslim minorities becomes a point of contention between literalist Islamists and modernizing reformists. While the former see such minorities as vehicles for Islamization of society, Gulen discourages Muslim minorities in the West from working for an Islamic state. Rather they should obey the local laws that allow them to practice their religion.

Both Wahhabi-driven Muslim outreach and the Gulen movement share the goal of wanting to call non-Muslims to Islam. But the methodologies are significantly different. There are many other agents of Islamic outreach, of course, but the Wahhabis and Gulen movement are helpful in exemplifying opposite methodological poles of the call to Islam. As we turn our attention to a range of Muslim methods of outreach, we should keep in mind who is undertaking the outreach, as that will provide a key indicator of the dynamics of the activity and its likely impact upon the target community.

### 3. HOW DO MUSLIMS DO OUTREACH?

In his study of Muslim mission activity especially focusing on the US, Poston draws a distinction between External-Institutional and Internal-Personal foci of mission activities.<sup>16</sup> This is helpful and we will follow that paradigm in the following discussion, striving wherever possible to identify the sources of funding, whether internal or external to the community where the outreach activity is taking place.

## External-Institutional Outreach Activities

### *Outreach through aid and development work*

There has been a massive rise in Islamic relief and development activity over the last 30 years. This has been facilitated by the vast oil wealth of Muslim donor nations. For example, in the case of Bangladesh, a major recipient of aid funds, many Islamic Non-Government Organisations (NGO) have emerged in recent decades to compete actively with other development organisations, including Christian and secular NGOs.<sup>17</sup>

Some of the most prominent Islamic NGOs involved in aid activity are the International Islamic Relief Organisation; Islamic African Relief Agency; Human Relief Agency; Islamic Mission Agency; Muslim Aid; Human Concern International; and the Islamic Coordination Council (an umbrella body).<sup>18</sup>

Support by Muslim governments for development assistance often has a religious dimension to it. Unlike the strict separation between Western Government and Christian NGO development activities in terms of Christian witness, those by Islamic government and Islamic NGOs (INGOs) are closely interlinked in the religious area.

Aid in the Saudi priority listing encompasses Islamic outreach; in the words of the 9/11 Commission report, "Closely tied to zakat [collection by the Saudi Government] is the dedication of the government to propagating the Islamic faith, particularly the Wahhabi sect that flourishes in Saudi Arabia."<sup>19</sup> Dowd-Gailey re-

ports that „current estimates [2004] suggest that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia spends \$4 billion annually on international aid, with two-thirds of that sum devoted to strictly Islamic development.”<sup>20</sup>

Kalimullah and Fraser conducted important research into particular case studies of Islamic aid projects. One of these, the Islam Prochar Samity (IPS), was established in Bangladesh by a group of new converts to Islam.<sup>21</sup> The project integrated development work with the teaching of Islam; it provided temporary hostel accommodation, and charitable dispensaries, while also running a Qur’an correspondence course. Kalimullah and Fraser reported that the project “concentrates its activities on converting non-Muslims to Islam.”<sup>22</sup> It received considerable funding support from the Jamaat-e-Islam, a political party in Bangladesh.

Another project reported by Kalimullah and Fraser was the Rabita Bangladesh, which commenced in Bangladesh with relief operations in 1978,<sup>23</sup> serving as the Bangladesh national office of the World Muslim League that is headquartered in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The priorities of this project were varied: funding for agencies involved in outreach to non-Muslims; medical care; hospitals; nurse training centres; village health worker training; and mobile dispensaries. The hospitals that were involved ran training courses to patients on Qur’an, Hadith, and hygiene, and distributed copies of the Qur’an to patients. The project also established vocational colleges, teaching vocational subjects and Islam.

Support for Rabita Bangladesh came from several sources. It received direct funding support from the International Secretariat based in Saudi Arabia. Other supporting bodies were the Bangladesh Government, via one of its Ministries, the Islamic Foundation, as well as foreign governments – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya – and local political parties, especially the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami.

Both of the case studies cited above provide examples of aid-facilitated outreach being supported by reformist groups or governments of a more literalist, Islamist orientation.

### ***Outreach through mosque construction***

The establishment of mosques among new Muslim communities in the West has been significant. Between 1985 and 2006 official mosque numbers in Britain grew from 338 to 754, although in all by the latter year there were over 2000 Islamic community centres and mosques of all types.<sup>24</sup> Saudi Arabia has served as a significant source of funding in certain instances, such as the London Central Mosque (Regents Park Mosque), which reportedly received two million pounds from the Saudis for construction and a further contribution for the addition of the Islamic Cultural Centre on site. Saudi influence was ongoing, as seen by the fact that the Director of the Mosque in 2007 was a Saudi diplomat.<sup>25</sup>

A similar growth of mosques has taken place in France where, according to the Catholic News Agency, “In the last thirty years more mosques and Muslim prayer centers have been built ... than Catholic churches in the last century.”<sup>26</sup>

Mosque numbers in Germany have similarly increased rapidly, from three in 1990 to 159 in 2008. In August 2008, Cologne city council approved the construction of a new US\$20 million mosque, with a 2,000 person capacity and twin minarets that will reach 170ft. Its proximity to Cologne cathedral sparked protests from the local non-Muslim population.<sup>27</sup>

In Spain, Muslim planners have an ambitious vision of recreating the city of Cordoba, once the heart of the ancient Islamic kingdom of al-Andalus. One of the aims is to provide a pilgrimage site for Muslims throughout Europe. It is proposed to construct a half-size replica of Cordoba's eighth century great mosque. Funds for the project are being sought from the governments of the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, and Muslim organisations in Morocco and Egypt. Other big mosques are planned for Medina Azahara near Cordoba, Seville and Granada.<sup>28</sup>

Mosque construction is underway on a significant scale in the United States as well. A Council on American-Islamic Relations report estimated that there were approximately 1200 mosques in the US in 2001.<sup>29</sup> New mosques are built or opened from time to time. One which attracted much media attention was the planned \$24 million mosque and cultural centre in Boston, built by the Islamic Society of Boston. Land for the mosque was reportedly acquired from the City of Boston for a fraction of its real value. Major funding for the mosque is being provided by the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.<sup>30</sup>

In Australia, mosque construction has been steady over recent decades, with

the majority of Australia's 60 being built in the last 40 years. The very large Muslim mosque in Lakemba in Sydney was financed with funding from Saudi Arabia, as well as with contributions from local Lebanese, Egyptians and others. The mosque in Darwin was constructed on land provided by way of a grant from the Federal Government, with the construction funded by Saudis and Pakistanis.<sup>31</sup> The Saudi connection has proven a source of concern to at least one Australian Government, as seen when the Government of Prime Minister John Howard (1996-2007) refused permission for Saudi investment in the construction of a mosque in Adelaide.<sup>32</sup>

### ***Outreach through investment in universities and schools***

Britain has served as a major focus for this form of Islamic outreach, with many major universities accepting funding for new professorships or departments. A 2009 report from the Centre for Social Cohesion captures much of the detail of this phenomenon. The table on the next page summarises some of its findings:

Apart from the university professorships and departments, mostly funded from Arab sources, there are specialised institutions which have been established by other groups which serve the call of Islamic outreach. The best example is the Islamic Foundation in Leicester, UK (established in 1973 with strong links to Pakistan's Islamist group the Jamaat-e-Islami) which is both a higher education provider and an instrument of Islamic outreach through its publishing and other activities.



Institution	Year of support; donor; amount and purpose/nature of support
London School of Oriental and African Studies	1995; King Fahd of Saudi Arabia; GBP1 million for Centre for Islamic Studies, including Professorship in Islamic Studies
University of Oxford	A representative sample of funding inputs <sup>1</sup> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1990; Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz; unknown amount to finance construction of the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies (OCIS)</li> <li>• 1997; King Fahd of Saudi Arabia; GBP 20 million for construction of new buildings for OCIS</li> <li>• 1997; Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences; GBP 2.5 million for study of the Islamic World at OCIS</li> <li>• 2008; Qatar Foundation; amount unknown to establish chair in Islamic studies</li> </ul>
University of Cambridge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2005; Sultan Qaboos of Oman; GBP2.8 million for Professorship of Modern Arabic</li> <li>• 2008; Prince Waleed bin Talal of Saudi Arabia; GBP8 million for funding of Islam Centre</li> </ul>
University of Edinburgh	2008; Prince Waleed bin Talal of Saudi Arabia; GBP8 million for funding of Islam Centre
Durham University, UK	2006; Dr Sheikh Sultan al Qasimi, the Ruler of Sharjah; „generously supported by his highness“ for establishment of the Sharjah Chair in Islamic Law/Islamic Thought

<sup>1</sup> R. Simcox, *A Degree of Influence: The funding of strategically important subjects in UK universities*, London: Centre for Social Cohesion, 2009.

On the European continent similar developments are taking place. One example of a professorship endowed from the oil-rich Arab world is the Leiden University Chair in Oriental Studies for the Study of Islam in the Contemporary Western World, funded by the Sultan of Oman. The job advertisement stated that “the holder of the chair will teach in bachelor and postgraduate programmes, conduct, develop and supervise research, and contribute to the devel-

opment of the programme ‘Islamic theology’”.

Across the Atlantic, substantial funds have been given to universities in North America by Arab donors. Harvard and Georgetown universities, both highly prominent and influential institutions, each received \$20 million from a Saudi prince to enhance their offerings in Islamic Studies.<sup>34</sup> Simon Fraser University in British Columbia, Canada,

received funding from Muslim donors to establish a Center for the study of Islam. An amount of \$1 million was received from the Amin Lalji family and \$250,000 from school Board of Governors chair Saida Rasul and her husband Firoz.<sup>35</sup>

Apart from inputs to government or private universities in the West, Muslim donors also provide funding for the establishment of specialist Islamic schools. Again Saudi Arabia is prominent. For example, the King Khalid Islamic College in Melbourne, Australia, purchased its first buildings in 1982 through a donation from King Khalid of Saudi Arabia.<sup>36</sup> Initially a primary school, it now offers instruction to students from Kindergarten to Year 12.

It is important at this juncture to make mention of another approach to Islamic schools: that pursued by the Gulen movement, presented earlier as an example of more modernizing reformist approaches. The Gulen movement has established multiple networks of schools in Turkey and around the world over the last three decades to promote Fetullah Gulen's version of reformist thinking.

This growth has been seen in Australia. The first Gulen school was established in Australia in 1996, and since then a further eleven schools have been founded. Funding for these schools has come from three sources: school fees; donations from the Turkish community; and government funding from both State and Federal governments. At present there are very few non-Muslim students in Australian Gulen schools, and the curriculum followed is

largely secular, though the NSW Gulen schools do offer religious studies as an optional subject, teaching all the major religions.<sup>37</sup> A largely secular curriculum seems to characterize the Gulen schools around the world, with the Islamic identity of the institution being projected more by presence and engagement rather than more overt promotion and missionary outreach.

### ***Outreach through political participation***

The British context provides an example of how some Muslims see political participation as a means of promoting the call to Islam.

Prior to the June 2001 British general elections, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), Britain's leading Muslim representative body at that time, was proactive in giving advice to the Muslim community. It urged Muslims to vote, declaring that "if we accept that the Muslim community has important needs that require government action... there are precious few alternatives to the ballot box."<sup>38</sup> The MCB argued forcefully that non-voting would lead to further marginalization of the Muslim community.

In order to facilitate the task of voting for its constituency, the MCB set up a dedicated website<sup>39</sup> to provide assistance to British Muslims in making their choices. The advice given was not party-specific, but attributed a ranking to candidates in constituencies with a heavy Muslim population according to their attitudes on issues of key concern to Muslims: Palestine, the Terrorism Act, Iraq, Kashmir, Kosovo, gay marriages, and so forth.<sup>40</sup> In that way the MCB hoped to increase

the numbers of candidates, regardless of party affiliations, who were sympathetic to Muslim causes, thus promoting those causes and concerns.

The MCB is not itself a political party. However, the formation of Islamic political parties is another vehicle for Islamic outreach, and this can be seen in the Islamic Party of Britain (IPB). It also urged Muslims to vote, as would be expected of a party contesting the elections. Nevertheless, it pointed to perceived imperfections of the electoral system, expressing a clear participate-to-influence mindset in saying:

“Muslim participation in politics... must put forward meaningful alternatives which are viable for society at large, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, and improve the situation of both. It is the old task of Dawah by appropriating people’s concerns and showing them a way out of the disastrous consequences of abiding with a system built on falsehood, oppression and ignorance.”<sup>41</sup>

Hence the IPB saw its participation in the political process as a way of fulfilling the duty of da’wa, or calling others to the faith of Islam.

### ***Outreach through key industries and institutions***

A phenomenon that deserves attention as an element in outreach is gradual increase in Islamic influence upon key industries and institutions. Many sectors could be considered; for our purposes we will focus upon three: the financial sector, legal institutions and the media.

### ***Shari’a Financing and Islamic Banking***

Saudi Arabia’s Al Rajhi Bank, the world’s largest Islamic lender, had assets worth \$33 billion at the end of September 2008.<sup>42</sup> This reminds us of another key instrument of Islamic outreach: Shari’a financing and Islamic banking, which has attracted much interest over the last decade. Such interest comes from the highest levels; in March 2008 the British Chancellor of the Exchequer announced measures to promote Islamic finance in Britain<sup>43</sup> in order to tap into some of the vast funding available.

Britain saw its first Islamic bank, the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB), founded in 2002. It pioneered a new approach to banking which has further expanded in the UK in the wake of the financial crisis which struck in late 2007. IBB’s business is based on the principles of Islamic finance that stipulate that savings and loan products are offered without the use of interest. By August 2008, fully Sharia-compliant banks had more than 30,000 customers across the UK. The IBB itself had witnessed significant growth in non-Muslim customers since the onset of the financial crisis as Islamic banks gained a reputation for being somewhat insulated from the credit crisis.<sup>44</sup>

In such a climate, non-Islamic banks sought to cash in on the new financial wave, by offering certain Shari’a-compliant products, including bank accounts,<sup>45</sup> and drawing in Muslim scholars to advise on developing new services. As a further step towards Shari’a financing, the UK’s first Shari’a-compliant prepaid MasterCard was launched in August 2008. Fur-

thermore Lloyds TSB offered a Shari'a-compliant home finance product.

Such developments are not unique to Britain. The large global bank, HSBC, offered its first Shari'a-compliant services through its Amanah unit.<sup>46</sup> In Sweden, fund company Selector Management registered that country's first Shari'a fund at the end of July 2008, and the following month, Avanza Bank had developed and offered the fund, Selector world shariah value, to its customers.<sup>47</sup>

The blog Shariah Finance Watch argues strongly for the link between Shari'a financing and Islamic outreach in the following terms:

"Shariah banks in Europe and Asia are being encouraged to increase their "socialization" programs so as to attract more non-Muslim customers. This is more proof that Shariah-Compliant Finance is in fact "missionary work." Shariah finance does not exist merely to give pious Muslims a way to invest according to their religious beliefs. Shariah finance exists to promote Shariah and Islam and pushing it out to non-Muslims is key to them achieving their goal."<sup>48</sup>

#### *The Push for Accommodating Shari'a in Western Legal Systems*

Requests for aspects of Shari'a Law to be accommodated within non-Muslim legal systems have been heard increasingly in the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> and the early 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, as Muslim minority communities settle into their new homelands in the West. Britain provides a relevant focus for this discussion.

A formal request for aspects of Shari'a Law to be incorporated into English law was first made to the British Government by the Union of Muslim Organisations of UK and Eire (UMO) in the 1970s.<sup>49</sup> At the time, the UMO represented 150 different Muslim organisations. That initial request was rejected. In practice, however, accommodation has been taking place in recent decades.

Newbigin, Sanneh and Taylor comment that "the English legal system turns a blind eye to any ethnic law, so long as it does not actively violate English law."<sup>50</sup> However, there are instances where such clashes have been ignored. On the question of polygamy, this practice is specifically forbidden under UK Law and specifically sanctioned under Islamic Law. However, polygamous Muslim marriages have been widely reported in Britain for many years<sup>51</sup> with no action taken to circumscribe this practice.

Other clashes between western legal systems and Shari'a are quite possible. Marriage ceremonies where both bride and bridegroom are not present can occur within Islamic communities but are alien to Western legal norms. Similarly, in matters such as divorce, custody of children, female circumcision, marriages of underage children, and the ban on Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men, Shari'a provisions are potentially at odds with Western norms.

Since the UMO request of the 1970s there have been further calls for aspects of Sharia Law to be integrated within British law. Over time the British refusal to countenance such a suggestion has weakened, as seen

in the 2008 statements by both the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Lord Chief Justice, where each spoke somewhat sympathetically about this suggestion.

Such openness by the British elite ignores the fact that large numbers of Muslims would not look favourably on the incorporation of aspects of Shari'a within British law. In a November 2004 ICM poll of British Muslims for the Guardian newspaper,<sup>52</sup> 61% of respondents supported the use of Shari'a courts in Britain to resolve civil cases within the Muslim community. In a February 2006 ICM poll for the Telegraph,<sup>53</sup> 40% of Muslim respondents supported the introduction of Shari'a Law to certain areas of Britain. These results caused shockwaves in Britain when they were announced. Yet these figures also reflect that somewhere between 40-60% of British Muslims do not support the implementation of Shari'a in Britain. So outreach through Shari'a implementation is evidently a controversial proposal among Britain's Muslim community.

In Canada this same matter was discussed in 2003-2004. In the former year, the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice announced a plan to establish faith-based tribunals for the Muslim community of some 400,000 resident in the province of Ontario.<sup>54</sup> This led to a report commissioned by Government to look into the suggestion, which came down in favour, triggering huge controversy. Some of the most vocal opponents were Muslim activists, such as Homa Arjomand, the Iranian organiser of the International Campaign Against Sharia Court in Canada movement, who argued that the recommendations would set back

Canadian law by 1,400 years. She argued passionately as follows:

„Our lawyers are studying the decisions of several arbitration cases and will bring them to court and expose how women are victimised by male-dominated legal decisions based on 6th-century religion and traditions.“

So great was the tension generated by the proposal that the Premier of Ontario, Dalton McGuinty, eventually dismissed the recommendations of the report.

#### *Outreach through the Media*

A key way that the call to Islam is heard in Western countries is through increasing numbers of dedicated campaigns designed to raise awareness of Islam and to present Islam in a positive light, ostensibly to counter negative stereotyping which has been associated with the faith in the past.

In Britain Islam Awareness Week has been held annually since 1994, and received considerable attention from the media both in the lead up to and during the week in question. The purpose of this campaign is defined as follows on its website:

“to invite all Muslims to work together during the week in sharing Islam with the public at large, providing information regarding its message and way of life, and removing misunderstandings in the process.”<sup>55</sup>

The Islam Awareness Week model has been replicated by Muslim communities in other locations, such as Australia, where it is advertised with a clear flavour of outreach as follows:

“Islamic Awareness Week (IAW) is typically a week long ‘get to know Islam and Muslims’ campaign that occurs across many university campuses in and outside of Australia. This campaign includes a string of lectures that are especially catered towards non-Muslims who are interested in learning more about Islam and issues that are related to it. On top of that, there are many other activities to partake in.”<sup>56</sup>

Islam Awareness Week sets the stage for other elements in Islam-promotion campaigns on the mainstream media. A “BBC Islam season” held in the Summer of 2001 provides a further British example of how Muslims go about their task of calling others to their faith. The series included an assortment of films on history, contemporary social issues, theology and doctrine. These films demonstrated a number of characteristic features.

First, the Islamic programmes sought to debunk negative stereotypes of Islam among the majority non-Muslim community. Initially interviews with non-Muslims in the street were presented, highlighting negative popular views of Islam.<sup>57</sup> Then a sympathetic focus on women’s rights in marriage and divorce was included in one programme.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, the programmes portrayed Islamic radical groups such as the Taliban as being driven by nationalist concerns rather than from Islamic teaching.<sup>59</sup>

Second, the programmes placed a heavy emphasis upon white British converts to Islam, thus seeking to appeal to a non-Muslim audience in Britain.<sup>60</sup> One white convert interviewed declared that

“Hopefully this is the future of England... Islam has taken root here and it is growing, and insh allah it will spread and people will come to know what it is.”<sup>61</sup>

Third, those interviewees and situations selected often seem to have been chosen to appeal to, and be identifiable by, the ordinary masses among the viewing audience. For example, one young woman convert to Islam adopted a speaking style which was interspersed with exclamations such as “Oh my God” and “Damn it”, thus striking chords with many young non-Muslim British viewers who frequently blaspheme and curse.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, Lord Ahmed of Rotherham was portrayed as a self-made man and a former worker in a fish and chips shop, and described himself as the „Peer of the people.“<sup>63</sup> Prince Naseem, a sporting icon, was chosen as the focus of one programme in order to attract widespread interest. He commented that

“although I’ve made my name as a boxer, what really matters to me is my faith. Islam is the cause of my confidence and my strength.”<sup>64</sup>

Fourth, programmes addressing history provided Muslim perspectives in a range of ways. Both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars were consulted in preparing these programmes, thus creating an impression of balance. Nevertheless Islamic perspectives on historical events were themselves not subject to scrutiny, being presented as historical accounts rather than statements of faith. For example, one programme included the statement that at the end of the pilgrimage animals are sacrificed “to commemorate Prophet

Ibrahim who was asked to sacrifice his son Isma'il." No recognition was given of the alternative view, found within both the biblical materials and in many classical commentaries on the Qur'an, that the attempted sacrifice by Abraham was of Isaac, not Ishmael.<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, a programme on Islamic history painted Muslims as supremely tolerant of other faiths. This idealised view was not challenged with reference to the status of dhimmi or to discrimination and persecution of minorities which occurred during certain periods of Islamic imperial history.<sup>66</sup> The same programme provided a very negative portrayal of the Christian Crusades and associated massacres, but no mention was made of Muslim territorial expansion and massacres of non-Muslims by Muslims in earlier centuries prior to the Crusades.

Fifth, frequent comparative comments were made regarding Islam and Christianity. All favoured Islam and included thinly veiled criticisms of Christianity. For example, a middle-aged white female convert presented her Christian upbringing as irrelevant to the real world.<sup>67</sup> A spokesman from the Birmingham Mosque commented that „If Islam is relegated to rituals, then it will become a kind of religious ghetto ... a religious zoo.“ This statement was made in a way which implied that churches and temples appear in this very manner.<sup>68</sup> Furthermore, references to miracles experienced by Muslims in the modern day<sup>69</sup> stressed the extraordinary spiritual claims of Islam in a British society that was increasingly rejecting its own spiritual heritage.

The final key characteristic of the season of Islamic programmes was that

discussion of Islamophobia, or negative caricaturing of Islam by non-Muslims, made no reference to Muslims engaging in similarly negative caricaturing of the West and Christianity.

Of course, such „spin-doctoring“ is not unique to Islam and Muslims. But it does again show a method of outreach by Muslims to non-Muslims.

### ***Dialogue with the Church as Outreach***

Perhaps the clearest example of dialogue as Islamic Outreach is found in the Common Word initiative. The roots of this initiative lie in Pope Benedict XVI's speech at the University of Regensburg on 12 September 2006. That speech, entitled "Faith, Reason and the University — Memories and Reflections",<sup>70</sup> provided a platform for the Pope to argue for a symbiotic relationship between faith and reason.

During his presentation, Pope Benedict cited a statement by the medieval Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Paleologus as follows: "Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached." This widely quoted (and misquoted) statement was far from being the centerpiece of the Pope's argument, rather providing a detail among many in what was an eloquent and highly scholarly presentation.

Nevertheless, this reference to Emperor Manuel II Paleologus's words triggered Muslim protests around the world. It also led to an approach by Muslim scholars to the Pope for dialogue, culminating in a letter entitled "A Common Word Between Us and

You”,<sup>71</sup> signed by 138 Muslim scholars from diverse locations and sectarian groups and presented to the Pope on 11 October 2007.

The Common Word initiative called for dialogue between the Christian and Muslim worlds for the sake of world peace, and quoted as its cornerstone verse 64 of Qur’anic chapter 3: Say: O People of the Scripture! Come to a common word between us and you: that we shall worship none but God, and that we shall ascribe no partner unto Him, and that none of us shall take others for lords beside God. And if they turn away, then say: Bear witness that we are they who have surrendered (unto Him).

The Common Word document also included copious quotes from the first three Gospels, but carefully avoided quoting from the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles, which Muslim critics of Christianity have long labeled as outside those materials which were revelations from God. In this way the Common Word letter subtly affirmed established Islamic claims about the unreliability of the canonical collection of the New Testament.

In assessing the Common Word document, it is important to examine closely a range of classical Muslim commentaries on the Qur’anic verse 3:64 presented as central to the argument of the initiative. Such an examination shows that in fact the original context of the verse in question did not relate to common belief in Christianity and Islam in love of God and of neighbour, as presented by the Common Word document. Rather the historical context of the verse was of a more polemical nature where

Christians were called to accept the Islamic understanding of the nature of God and of Jesus and to reject the traditional Christian belief in the divinity of Christ. In short, Qur’an 3:64 has traditionally been used by Muslims to present a challenge to people who they believe have a false concept of deity.<sup>72</sup>

It may well be that some of the Muslim scholars supporting the Common Word initiative are seeking a new dynamic in Christian-Muslim interaction by reinterpreting Q3:64 for today. But whether their motive is that or is rather a re-affirmation of the traditional understanding of this verse, the Common Word initiative shows how dialogue can be used for outreach, ultimately designed to call others to Islam.

### ***Non-Muslim facilitation of Islamic Outreach***

The discussion above of the BBC Islam Season relates to a further method of Islamic outreach; namely one where non-Muslims aid the call to Islam. The BBC Islam Season, for example, can take place because the BBC, itself a non-Muslim organization, facilitates a set of programs which promote the faith and message of Islam. Of course, examples can be provided where such bodies provide similar space to other faiths, such as the very popular BBC series Songs of Praise. Our purpose here is not to suggest that such programming should not take place; rather it is to paint a portrait of the diverse ways that the call to Islam can and does take place in countries where Muslims are in the minority.

In some instances, western governments facilitate the Islamic call through the provision of buildings or



grants. We saw earlier where Australian and British government grants made possible the construction of mosques in Darwin and London respectively. Similarly government grants enable the establishment and maintenance of some Islamic schools in both Britain and Australia.

Some researchers argue that the content of what is taught in non-Muslim schools also aids the call to Islam. For example, the American Textbooks Council has conducted a multi-stage survey of American school textbooks that present matters relating to Islam. Its report argues that:

“... on controversial subjects, world history textbooks make an effort to circumvent unsavoury facts that might cast Islam past or present in anything but a positive light. Islamic achievements are reported with robust enthusiasm. When any dark side surfaces, textbooks run and hide.”<sup>73</sup>

### **Internal-Personal Mission Activities**

Poston’s study of Islamic Da’wa in the United States<sup>74</sup> has as its second element those methods of outreach that focus more on individuals than institutions. This approach to outreach has many different methods.

Some Islamic institutions specialise in calling individuals to Islam, whether calling Muslims to be more devout or calling non-Muslims to convert. An example is the UK Islamic Mission, founded in 1962 and recipient of some funding from Saudi Arabia.<sup>75</sup> Its website defines its goals as five-fold:<sup>76</sup>

- educating the community via its mosques and special schools (*madrasas*);
- *da’wa* and interfaith discourse;
- publishing literature on Islam;
- providing international relief and welfare for the poor and needy;
- providing provisions and activities for young Muslims.

It is in the area of “interfaith discourse” that much outreach to individual non-Muslims takes place. This is one of the preferred methods of outreach for university-based Muslims, who invite non-Muslims to public discussions and debates. An invitation I received by email in February 2009 illustrates this, as follows:

„I hope you are in the best of health. We invite you on behalf of ... University Debate Society ... to take part in our upcoming series of debate and discussion lectures and symposiums which cover a wide array of subjects mainly revolving around God, religion and atheism and we would be very privileged if you could join us as part of a panel. Please do let us know if you are available and we will do our best to present something suitable for you. Some of the specific topics planned are

- The trinity
- The concept of God (shared panel)
- The historical Bible
- Islam and Christianity (not decided)

The dates are flexible so we can take in dates which are more convenient to you. The topics are not fixed and

if you are interested we can modify the title to accommodate any suggestion you may have. Thank you very much for your time.”

Such university debates are aiming to reach young non-Muslims, the next generation of leaders who could bring about important changes to western countries if they were to embrace Islam. Similarly, many Islamic outreach workers focus upon cutting edge technology to call others to Islam, thereby hoping to reach large numbers, including the young who are much more technologically aware than older generations of non-Muslims.

So the Internet is very well provided with Islamic websites engaging in outreach to non-Muslims. Some of the most prominent are:

[www.missionislam.com](http://www.missionislam.com)  
[www.islamicity.com](http://www.islamicity.com)  
[www.islam.com](http://www.islam.com)  
[www.muslimconverts.com](http://www.muslimconverts.com)  
[www.islamway.com](http://www.islamway.com)

Similarly, YouTube carries thousands of Islamic statements and short programs posted by Muslim workers intent on outreach to non-Muslims. There are also large numbers of DVDs available that are produced for the purposes of calling non-Muslims to Islam.

A striking feature of this kind of Muslim outreach, targeting individuals, is the use of convert testimonies. A number of themes are recurrent in these testimonies explaining why the narrators turned to Islam from either secularism or Christianity, as follows:

1. The Christian doctrine of original sin makes no sense;
2. Unlike Christianity, Islam makes sense;
3. The beautiful sound of the Arabic language was magnetic;
4. Islam’s truth is portrayed as inescapable;
5. After embracing Islam, all hesitation and confusion faded away;
6. Science serves as proof for Islam’s truthfulness;
7. Islam is presented as a remedy for the growing secularization of Western life, which Christianity fails to fill;
8. Negative press and social prejudices had the counter-effect of introducing Islam as the true religion;
9. The 9/11 attacks awoke a sense of their curiosity about Islam;
10. Islam is an egalitarian religion, blind to the racial prejudices so common to Western culture;
11. Personal friendships with Muslims helped to bring about conversion;
12. Falling in love with a Muslim was the impetus for conversion.

#### 4. RESPONDING TO MUSLIM OUTREACH METHODS

As Christians consider the ways that Muslims are involved in disseminating the call to Islam, there are several possible pitfalls.

First, Christians might be purely reactive, allowing their own agenda to be determined by a perceived need to respond to Muslim activities. This would be a mistake, as Christianity is a dynamic faith in its own right,

well capable of setting its own goals and priorities without reference to any other faith. Having said that, it is in the interests of Christianity to take note of what others are doing in areas of potential competition and, if necessary, to build a response to that other activity into their own policies and actions.

A second possible pitfall is to unthinkingly regard every aspect of the call to Islam as a field of competition and rivalry. As we have seen in earlier discussion, Muslims are very diverse, as are their methods and goals. It may well be that Christians can partner with some Muslims in specific areas of outreach. So a constructive approach to this whole area is needed from the outset.

A third possible pitfall might be the setting of unrealistic expectations of Christian unity, accompanied by the rigid adherence to traditional intra-Christian partnerships and alliances. Christian views of Islam and Muslims are diverse; one Christian's view of a possible challenge from Islam is another Christian's perception of a potential for partnership. Such differences would not necessarily fall along traditional denominational lines. For example, on the question of championing the rights of Christian minorities experiencing discrimination under Muslim rule, Protestant evangelicals often share much more with the Roman Catholic Church than they do with mainline Protestants.

With the above caveats in mind, we will now propose a variety of responses to the methods of Islamic outreach discussed earlier in this paper. These ideas are presented in the following

table, and divided according to possible responses from the church and possible responses from the government and other secular bodies (Table II opposite page).

In selecting possible partners from the Muslim community, clearly the most likely candidates are modernizing, participatory reformists, as well as possibly some traditionalist groups. Hence, Christians can look with interest at the activities of some groups such as the Gulen movement, as well as some groups in Southeast Asia: the Liberal Islam Network, Sisters in Islam, Malaysia's Justice Party and the Indonesian Nahdatul-Ulama. Further afield, Christians might productively form alliances with more moderate political groupings in the Muslim world, such as the Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) and liberal political leaders in countries such as Jordan and Egypt.

Muslim groups least likely to serve as candidates for partnership with Christians are the more literalist, Islamist reforming forces which are driving much of the call to Islam around the world today: the Saudi-Arabian government and its agents, the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami, and Islamizing elements that can skillfully speak the language of the West, but in fact seek to redefine it in their own image.

In the final analysis, Christians and Muslims must find a way to live alongside each other, at least in simple coexistence, but also hopefully with cooperation and partnership in certain areas. The road ahead promises to be bumpy at times, but it is a road which must be travelled with confidence, conviction and dedication.

Table II Possible Responses to Muslim Outreach (Part 1)

Islamic Outreach	Christian Response	Secular response
Growth in Muslim minorities in the West.	Partner with and encourage integrationist Muslims.	Encourage local politicians to think about the ramifications of growth in Islamic minorities; Open up the multiculturalism debate, so that social cohesion is emphasized.
Outreach through aid and development work.	Review aid policy within Christian agencies to see about reinforcing Christian witness; lobby governments to provide equal support to Christian projects as to Muslim projects; explore partnerships between Christian and Islamic NGOs and specific projects.	
Outreach through mosque construction.		Lobby for mosque numbers to reflect population proportions (as in Malaysia); close monitoring as to what is being taught in Muslim mosques and prayer rooms (as in Egypt and Singapore).
Outreach through investment in universities and schools.	Churches should strengthen Christian identity of church schools where it is weak; lobby governments for symmetrical access of studies of Christianity.	Lobby governments to closely scrutinise sources of university funding; close monitoring as to what is being taught in Muslim schools.
Outreach through political participation.	Support Christian political lobby groups; build bridges to Christian politicians; increase Christian political discourse at time of elections.	

Table II Possible Responses to Muslim Outreach (Part 2)

Islamic Outreach	Christian Response	Secular response
<i>Outreach through key industries and institutions:</i>		
Shari'a Financing and Islamic Banking	Monitor this and lobby against it.	Monitor this and lobby against it.
The Push for Accommodating Shari'a in Western Legal Systems	Monitor this and lobby against it.	Oppose requests for acceptance of Shari'a as a parallel legal system.
Outreach through the Media	Lobby media networks to provide greater access for Christian programming, to reflect population proportions.	
Dialogue with the Church as Outreach	Participate in dialogue, using the opportunity to have frank exchanges, engaging with difficult issues, but building relationships at the same time.	
Non-Muslim facilitation of Islamic Outreach	Request equal support for Christian initiatives.	
<i>Internal-Personal activities:</i>		
Range of outreach activities	Accept these as part of a free society, but organise Churches, student groups etc. to be more proactive in Christian outreach. Equip Christians to understand Islam through study programmes.	
Islamist activities of controversy		Ban subversive conferences; Citizenship of Western countries should be cancelled for persons found guilty of planning terrorist acts.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>15</sup> "Dialogue the best form of preaching: Muslim leader", *The Melbourne Anglican*, August 2009, 6

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<sup>17</sup> N.A. Kalimullah & C.B. Fraser, "Islamic Non-Government Organisations in Bangladesh with Reference to Three Case Studies", *Islamic Quarterly*, XXXIV/2 (1990), 80.

<sup>18</sup> Jerome Bellion-Jourdan, "Islamic Relief Organizations: Between 'Islamism' and 'Humanitarianism'", *ISIM Newsletter*, May 2000, 15

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<sup>22</sup> N.A. Kalimullah & C.B. Fraser, “Islamic Non-Government Organisations in Bangladesh with Reference to Three Case Studies”, *Islamic Quarterly*, XXXIV/2 (1990), 85.

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<sup>66</sup> Islam, Empire of Faith. The Messenger. BBC, 2001.

<sup>67</sup> Haj: The Journey of a Lifetime. BBC, 2001.

<sup>68</sup> Fatima Salaria & Josh Halil (prod. & dir.) The Mosque. BBC, 2001.

<sup>69</sup> e.g. the middle-aged white female convert testifying to a miraculous experience on Mt Arafat in Haj: The Journey of a Lifetime. BBC, 2001.

<sup>70</sup> <http://www.zenit.org/article->

16955?l=english, accessed 16 August 2009.

<sup>71</sup> <http://www.acommonword.com/index.php?lang=en&page=option1>, accessed 16 August 2009.

<sup>72</sup> For another paper which considers this issue, see <http://www.acommonword.com/index.php?page=media&item=109>, accessed 16 August 2009.

<sup>73</sup> G. T. Sewall, Islam and the Textbooks, New York: American Textbook Council, 27

<sup>74</sup> Larry Poston, Islamic Da'wa in the West: Muslim Missionary Activity and the Dynamics of Conversion to Islam, Oxford: OUP, 1992.

<sup>75</sup> "Undercover Mosque", Dispatches, 2007

<sup>76</sup> <http://www.wliconline.org/index.php?state=1&page=-1&cat=62>, accessed 16 August 2009.

<sup>77</sup> The context of this statement is that the development agencies of both the US and Australian Governments, USAID and AUSAID respectively, have both provided some funding support for Islamic religious schools in Indonesia.

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*Hear O Israel:  
The LORD our God,  
the LORD is one.  
You shall love  
the LORD  
your God  
with all your heart  
and with all your soul  
and with all your might.*

*(Deut. 6:4-5)*